Privacy policy
people you know is a private photo-sharing app for the people you actually know. This page says what we hold about you, what we cannot see, and what happens when you leave. It is written to be read, not skimmed; it is short because there is not much to say.
Last updated: 12 November 2026.
Who is responsible, and where this applies
people you know is operated by people you know llc, a Texas limited liability company, at 2222 N Alamo St #118, San Antonio, TX 78215, United States. We decide what is collected and why, which makes us responsible for it. The company is represented by its managing member, Jean-Sébastien Basque-Girouard.
The same person is in charge of protecting personal information, at that address or at pykapp+privacy@proton.me, which is also the way to reach us about anything else on this page.
The app is offered in the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and Japan. The privacy law of the country you live in applies to what we do with your information:
- in the United States, the law of the state you live in;
- in Canada, federal privacy law (PIPEDA) and, if you are in Québec, Québec’s Law 25;
- in New Zealand, the Privacy Act 2020;
- in Singapore, the Personal Data Protection Act 2012;
- in Japan, the Act on the Protection of Personal Information.
The one-sentence version
Your photos, captions, comments, names and bios are encrypted on your phone before they leave it, with keys we never see. We hold the encrypted files, copies of those keys that are locked so that we cannot use them, the list of who you are connected to, and the bookkeeping needed to deliver things between you. We do not scan, read, rank, or sell any of it.
What we cannot see
Everything you would call content is sealed on your phone under keys that only your phone and the phones of the people you share with can use:
- photos, at every size we store them;
- captions;
- comments;
- your display name, your bio and your profile picture;
- the names of your albums;
- the names of your groups. A name given to a group before this version of the policy stays readable to us until you open the app after updating it; the app then seals the name.
- the place you add to a post: the words you typed for it, and which place on Google Maps they open. Everybody who gets the post sees them, and a tap on them sends both to Google, as Third parties we use says.
We store these as ciphertext. We cannot open them, and neither can anybody who obtains a copy of our servers. If you lose your recovery phrase and every phone that holds your key, your photos are gone. We cannot recover them, and this is deliberate: there is no copy that is ours to hand back.
When you invite somebody by email, your phone also sends us your display name, so that the email can say it is from you. When you invite them into an album, it sends the album’s name too, so that the email can say which album, and the app tells you so before you send the invitation. We put them in that email and keep them nowhere.
We also hold keys, every one of them locked before it reached us:
- a copy of your own key, sealed on your phone under the six words of your recovery phrase. It is how a new phone gets your key back. We never see the six words, so we cannot open it; anybody who had both our copy and your six words could, which is why the words are yours alone to keep;
- a list of the keys your phone has been given for the people you have met here, and of which of those people you added, sealed under your own key, so that a new phone can notice if a key is ever swapped and knows who you chose to share with. We cannot open that either;
- for each post, album and profile you can open, a copy of its key locked to your public key, which only the key on your phone opens.
Beside the first two we can read what it takes to store them and nothing more: the settings your phone needs to turn six words back into a key, a version number, and when each was last saved.
What we can see
To deliver a photo to the right people we hold, in the clear:
- your handle, and your email address and phone number if you gave us either;
- every handle you choose, with when you chose it and, if you have changed it since, when you stopped using it. If somebody emails us to report an account or to ask us to take something down, and names the account by its handle, this is how we tell which account had that handle when the email came in;
- if you set a password, a public key your phone made from it and the settings your phone needs to make that key again. We never receive the password itself. The key cannot be turned back into it, though it can be used to test guesses at it, as any stored password can. An account keeps at least one of the three, an email address, a phone number or a password, and may have more than one;
- for each passkey you add: its public key, the identifier your phone names it by when you sign in with it, which password manager made it, whether that password manager can copy it to your other devices, a count of its uses that some passkeys keep, and when you added it and last signed in with it. The private half of the passkey stays in your password manager and never reaches us;
- who you are connected to, and when you connected;
- add requests you send and receive, blocks you place, and anybody whose posts you have muted (a mute is yours alone; the other person is never told);
- an email address somebody typed to invite a person into an album, or an email address or phone number somebody typed to invite a person to the app, and when, until that person joins or the invitation lapses. If, before the invitation lapses, we delete the account that sent it because that account was engaged in child sexual abuse or exploitation, we keep the address or number until a year after our report about that account, as Deleting your account describes. For sixty days after we email an invitation, we also keep a fingerprint of the address (a one-way hash of it, not the address), so that the link in that email to stop invitations keeps working after the invitation is gone. If the person at an address asks us to stop sending invitations, we keep that fingerprint, so that we never email it an invitation again;
- if you joined through an invitation to an album, by signing up at the address it was sent to or by typing its code: that you did, when, whether it was the invitation that brought you in, and whether you used the app on or after the 30th day after you joined. We use it only to count how many people invitations bring in, and how many of them are still using the app a month later;
- the country your phone was set to when you made your account or, if you made it before 22 September 2026, the first time you opened the app after updating it. It is written once and never updated. We use it only to count how many people we serve in each country, because some countries’ laws start to apply once a service has enough users there;
- the language your app is set to, English or French, so that the notices we email everybody are in your language. Your phone sends it each time the app opens, so it changes when you change the app’s language;
- which of your groups a person is in (never shown to that person);
- who is in each album you are in;
- for every post: who made it, when, whether and when it was edited, who it was addressed to or which album it is in, who is named on it, whether it shares somebody else’s post again, how many frames it has, whether each is a photograph or a video and how long a video says it runs, how large the encrypted files are, the signature the author’s phone put on it (which shows who made it and says nothing about what is in it), and whether each recipient has seen it and when they first did. That is one moment per person per post; nothing records which photographs anybody looked at, and nobody is ever shown it;
- for every comment: who wrote it, on which post, when, and which comment it answers;
- reactions, which are one emoji each and are stored in the clear because a single emoji from a known set cannot be meaningfully encrypted;
- the text of any report you file, because a report is a message to us and we have to be able to read it; and, if somebody reports you, that they did, what they wrote, what we decided and when, and whether your account is suspended and since when;
- if you email us asking us to take something down, with or without an account: when your email came in, and a line saying who asked and how to reach them, which we keep with our record of what we removed;
- the text of any bug report you send, and the lines shown to you before you send it: the version of the app, the version of Android or iOS and the model of your phone. The report can also carry a short list of the last errors the app could not explain, shown to you under that line. The list names parts of the app’s own code, and never anything you wrote or posted. Nothing else goes with it—no screenshot, no file—and the app has no way to attach one;
- your activity list: what happened, who did it, on which post, when, and when you read it. An entry is kept for 128 days;
- whose posts you have asked to be told about, and the other switches in your settings;
- if you subscribe, which store you paid through, the store’s reference for the purchase, and when the period you paid for ends. The store holds who paid and how; we never see a card or a bank account. It is deleted with your account, unless we set it aside as Deleting your account describes;
- each time you signed in on a phone: when you did, when you last used the app there, and when you signed out. While you are signed in there, we also hold that phone’s push token, whether it is an Android phone or an iPhone, and which version of the app it runs;
- your two public keys, the one your photos are locked to and the one your posts are signed with. Both are the halves that are meant to be handed out. We also keep when the first was published;
- the moment you confirmed you were 18 or older (never your date of birth);
- counts of what your phone could and could not open, of whether it showed each notification we sent it, and of whether Google answered its searches for a place, added to a total the moment they arrive and not kept against your account.
This is the honest boundary of the claim. It is metadata, and metadata reveals who talks to whom. We keep it because the app cannot work without it, we keep as little of it as we can, and we keep our access logs for 30 days and no longer. Those logs record which kind of request was made and when, and not who made it: no address of yours, no identifier, no page you asked for.
What we use it for
We use what we hold for these things and nothing else:
- to make your account, sign you in, and send the one-time codes that sign-in uses to your email address or, by text message, to your phone number;
- to email you, as well as tell you in the app, before a change to the terms or to this policy that matters to you, before the service is sold, and before it closes;
- to deliver what you post to the people you chose, and what they post to you;
- to send pushes to your phones: the notifications the app shows you, and pushes that show nothing and only tell the app to fetch something new;
- to send one email to an address somebody typed to invite a person into an album or to the app, and to stop when that person asks us to. We send nothing to a phone number typed to invite somebody: the person inviting texts it from their own phone, and we keep the number only so that an account made with it can be connected to them;
- to act on reports and keep people safe, as the moderation policy and the child safety standards describe;
- to find out that something is broken, from the counts your phone sends and the bug reports you choose to send;
- to count how many people invitations to an album bring in, and how many of them are still using the app a month later;
- to do what the law requires of us.
A handle, your date of birth, and an email address, a phone number or a password are what an account needs: without them we cannot make one. Everything else is yours to give or not.
Where it is held, and for how long
Our servers, our database and the second copy of the encrypted files are in data centres in the United States. The encrypted files themselves are in object storage run by a company based in the United States, in its North American region; it holds ciphertext and never a key. An encrypted copy of our database, made every night, is kept there too, and only we can open it. Emails you send us are kept in our mailbox in Switzerland, as Third parties we use says.
If you live outside the United States, your information is held outside your country, and while it is there it is subject to United States law, including lawful requests by US authorities. We are telling you because Québec’s Law 25 and Japan’s privacy law require it and because it is the kind of thing you should be able to find out without asking.
What such a request could reach is what this page already says we hold: the encrypted files and the locked keys, neither of which we can open, and the metadata. There is no key here that we can use, and so none that anybody can compel us to hand over or to use, which is the point of the whole arrangement rather than a happy accident. What a server made to act dishonestly from then on could do is a different question, and how it works answers it.
The United States has no single national privacy law of the kind Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and Japan have, and no national privacy regulator like theirs. Privacy there is protected by federal laws that each cover one kind of information, by the privacy laws some states have passed, and by the Federal Trade Commission, which can act against a company that breaks the promises its privacy policy makes. We decided how to protect your information knowing that, and what protects it here is therefore what this page commits us to, which is the same whichever country you live in, and the fact that we cannot read your content at all.
We keep what is above for as long as your account exists, and then:
- when you delete your account, the keys go at once, the sealed copy of your own key among them, and the encrypted files leave storage eight days later;
- the second copy of the encrypted files follows storage within a day, and keeps a file storage deleted for 30 days more, in case it was deleted by mistake. So a file you delete is gone from it within six weeks, and until then it is ciphertext whose keys were destroyed when you deleted it;
- backups of our database are kept 35 days, and the output of anything we run by hand against the database is deleted within a week, so a row deleted today, a deleted account’s included, can survive in those for that long and no longer. If we ever restore the database from one of those backups, an account you deleted after the moment of that backup is deleted again before anybody can use the app;
- what we type when we run something by hand against the database can hold an account’s handle or email address. Our hosting provider keeps it in its record of everything we do on its servers, so that we can find out what happened if somebody breaks into them, and it is deleted within a year of being typed;
- each encrypted copy of our database at the storage company is deleted within 35 days of being made, and kept longer only while we are using it to recover from losing the database;
- access logs are kept 30 days;
- the database’s own log of errors and of slow queries is kept 30 days, and it can name the handle or the email address one was about;
- the counts your phone sends are added to a total on arrival and are never stored against your account, so there is nothing to keep;
- the record of a search is swept after the hour it is rate-limited over;
- one-time sign-in codes, with the address or number they were sent to, and the record of each password sign-in, with the handle it was for and how many wrong guesses it drew, are swept after two days, which is what the limits on wrong guesses need to read. So is each challenge a phone signs to sign in with a passkey or to add one;
- after deletion we keep only the record described under Deleting your account below.
How we protect it
- Your content is encrypted on your phone before it leaves, with keys we never hold in a form we can use, so the most sensitive thing you give us is never readable here.
- Everything between the app and our servers travels encrypted.
- Our database is encrypted where it is stored and cannot be reached from the internet, only from our own servers.
- Only the people who run the service can reach our servers and our database, and the person named at the top of this page is responsible for how they do.
- We keep as little as the app can work with, and delete it on the schedule above.
What you can ask for
- See it. settings → export my data writes your posts, captions, comments and the handles of your connections to your phone, decrypted there because we hold nothing readable to give you. If you no longer have the phone, write to us and we will send what we hold.
- Correct it. Your handle and your display name are yours to change in the app. There is very little else we hold that you could correct, because we hold very little.
- Delete it. settings → delete my account, or this page if you cannot reach the app. Immediate, and not reversible.
- Take it elsewhere. Ask and we will send what we hold in a structured, commonly used machine-readable format. The export above already is one.
- Complain. Write to us first. If you are not satisfied, go to the privacy
regulator where you live:
- in Canada, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, and in Québec the Commission d’accès à l’information du Québec;
- in New Zealand, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner;
- in Singapore, the Personal Data Protection Commission;
- in Japan, the Personal Information Protection Commission;
- in the United States, your state attorney general.
To ask for any of this, write to pykapp+privacy@proton.me from the address on your account. If your account has no address, write from any address and give your handle, and we will ask you for something only the account’s owner could know. We do not charge for any of it, we will not make you justify asking, and we answer as soon as we can and within four weeks at the latest.
If something goes wrong
If personal information we hold is lost or reaches somebody it should not, we will tell the regulators that have to be told, within the time each of them allows. If there is a real risk of serious harm to you, we will tell you too, promptly and in plain words: what happened, what it reached, and what you can do. We will keep a record of such incidents whether or not they reach that bar, because Québec’s Law 25 requires one and because an incident nobody wrote down is one nobody learns from.
What we cannot do is tell you that your photographs were read, because they cannot be: what an attacker who took everything we have would hold is ciphertext, keys locked so that they cannot be used, and the metadata this page lists.
Who else sees anything
Nobody, unless you share it with them. Only people you have both agreed to connect with can see what you post, and only the people you address a post to receive it. The exception is an album: what you put in one is seen by everybody in it, including people you are not connected to, and the album lists who they are. There is no public profile, no search by name, no suggestions, and no way for a stranger to find you unless they already know your exact handle, email address or phone number. Somebody who knows one can ask to connect, unless you have limited requests to people with a mutual in common, and sees nothing of yours until you accept.
What you share with someone, they can keep. The app does not stop screenshots and cannot recall a photo from a phone that has already downloaded it, any more than any other way of sending a photo can.
What we do not do
- We do not sell, rent or share your data with anybody.
- We do not show advertising and do not build profiles for it.
- We do not scan content, because we cannot see it.
- We do not send you engagement notifications: there is no “you haven’t posted in a while”, no digest, no streak.
- We do not collect analytics about what you look at, and the app contains no crash-reporting or analytics library. If your phone is set to share usage and diagnostics with Google or Apple, they tell us that the app crashed and where in our code; that report is theirs and contains none of your content.
- Your phone tells us how many photographs, captions, comments and album names it could or could not open since it last told us, how many of its searches for a place Google answered or refused, and which version of the app and of Android or iOS it runs. Never which ones, never what was searched for, and never whose. This is how we find out that something is broken before you would think to write to us, and it is on for everybody because it carries nothing that could be turned off.
Text messages
We text a phone number only when somebody types it into the app and asks for a sign-in code. Each text holds that code and nothing else.
Your phone number and your agreement to receive our texts are never sold, rented or shared with any third party or affiliate, for marketing or for any other purpose, except where the law requires it. This holds whatever else this page says about sharing. Amazon Web Services sends each text for us and uses the number only to deliver it.
Third parties we use
- Hosting for our servers, our database and the second copy of the encrypted files. The provider runs the machines and does not use what is on them.
- Object storage for the encrypted files and an encrypted copy of our database. The provider holds ciphertext and never a key.
- Push notifications, through Google’s Firebase Cloud Messaging on Android and Apple’s Push Notification service on iPhone. We send pushes to every phone signed in to your account, whether or not you have allowed notifications on it, and a phone shows one only if you have. Some pushes show nothing and only tell the app to fetch something new. A push carries a type and nothing else: no names, no captions, no post identifiers; the words you see are written by your phone.
- Email, to send one-time sign-in codes and invitations. The provider sees the address and the message, and nothing else about you.
- Text messages, through Amazon Web Services, to send one-time sign-in codes to a phone number. The provider uses the number and the message only to deliver the text. Text messages above says who else gets your number: nobody.
- Google Maps, if you add a place to a post. While you search, your phone sends Google what you type, with your phone’s internet address. When anybody taps the place on a post, their phone opens Google Maps with the words the poster typed and the place’s Google Maps id, and Google sees that phone’s internet address and the Google account it is signed in to, if any. Google never receives the post itself, and we never see what anybody searches for. Google may keep what it receives and use it for its own services, under the Google Privacy Policy.
- Google Play and the App Store, if you subscribe. Each takes the payment, and tells us whether the subscription you bought for this account is paid up and until when. At signup, each also answers the app’s question about whether you are under 18, as Children below describes.
- Our mailbox, at Proton, a company in Geneva, Switzerland. Every email you send us arrives there: a question, a request about your information, a request to delete an account or to take something down, and a reply to an email from the app. A reply to an email from the app first reaches Porkbun, a company based in the United States, which forwards it to the mailbox.
Each of them but Proton is a company based in the United States. Each receives only what its part of the service needs. All but Google Maps use it only to provide that part to us; Google Maps uses it as the Google Privacy Policy says. Using the app means your information goes to them and to the United States, and writing to us means your email goes to Switzerland. This page is where we tell you so before you sign up.
If the company is sold
If somebody else comes to own people you know llc, or the service is sold or merged into another company, bankruptcy included, what we hold goes with the service to whoever runs it next, and this page goes with it unchanged.
- The new owner can read no more than we can. What passes is what this page already lists: encrypted files and locked keys we cannot open, and the metadata. There is no key here that we can use, and so none that a buyer can use either.
- The new owner takes on every promise on this page, in our place. It may use what we hold only to run this service, for the purposes listed above, and every line under What we do not do binds it as it binds us. It can change this page only as Changes below allows.
- What we hold is never sold apart from the service, and never to anybody who will not take this page on. If nobody will take the service over on those terms, we close it the way the terms describe, with 30 days’ notice and time to export, and then delete what we hold.
- A company that is only thinking of buying us may be told how the service works and how many people use it, and nothing about any one of you.
- We will tell you in the app before it happens. You can export your data and delete your account before then if you would rather not go with it.
Deleting your account
settings → delete my account. Deleting is immediate and it is not reversible. If you no longer have the app, this page is how to ask without it:
- every key that let anybody open your posts is destroyed at once, and so are the keys that let you open theirs;
- your posts, comments and reactions are gone for everyone straight away;
- your connections are severed and your groups are removed;
- albums you made are closed, and the people in them keep what they already had from each other;
- every phone you were signed in on is signed out;
- if you joined through an invitation to an album, the record of it stops naming your account, and what is left of it names nobody;
- your handle and any email address and phone number are freed, any key made from a password is deleted, and so is the language your app was set to;
- the list of the handles you chose, with their dates, is deleted;
- what we hold about each of your passkeys is deleted. The passkey stays in your password manager, where it no longer opens anything.
Eight days later the encrypted files are removed from storage. Those eight days are not an undo: the keys were destroyed at the tap and nothing in the product can restore them. A deleted row can outlive the tap for up to 35 days in a backup of our database, and for up to a week in the output of something we ran by hand. Anything we typed by hand that held your handle or email address stays in our hosting provider’s record of what we do on its servers for up to a year after it was typed. The second copy of the encrypted files keeps each file for 30 days after it leaves storage, so the last of them is gone within six weeks of the tap. Signing in during that time with the same address starts a new, empty account.
What we keep afterwards is kept under an identifier that no longer carries your name, handle, address or key: that the account existed, when it was made, when it confirmed its age and when it was deleted; blocks you placed or that were placed against you; reports you filed or that were filed about you, and bug reports you sent; the country written for your account; the add requests you sent and received, marked cancelled; each time you signed in on a phone, with when you last used the app there and when that sign-in ended; and the rows of your posts and comments, marked deleted, which still say when each was made and, for a post, who it was addressed to. A deleted comment’s sealed text stays in its row until the post it was on is removed, and we serve it to nobody. Entries about what you did in other people’s activity lists go within 128 days.
One exception. When we delete an account because it was engaged in child sexual abuse or exploitation, we first keep a copy of the following records about it:
- its email address and phone number, if it had them;
- each handle it chose, and when it had each one;
- its two public keys;
- when it joined, and when it confirmed it was 18 or older;
- when we suspended it, if it was suspended at the time;
- each phone it was still signed in on, with that phone’s push token and the version of the app on it;
- each time it signed in on a phone: when, when it last used the app there, and when it signed out;
- who it was connected to, and since when;
- when it posted, how many photos and videos each post held, and to whom;
- which store its subscription was paid through, if it had one, with the store’s reference for it and when the period paid for ends;
- for each emailed invitation to an album that it accepted, when the invitation was sent and when it accepted it;
- each invitation to an album or to the app that the account had sent and that had not yet expired: the email address or phone number it was for, when the account sent it, and when we emailed it, if we did;
- for each of those invitations, the account that has that address or number, or that used the invitation’s code, if there is one;
- what the report we acted on said or, for a report by email, our note of that email.
We use that copy to report the account to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, which receives these reports in the United States. We keep the copy for a year from that report, as United States law requires, and then delete it. The child safety standards say more.
Exporting your data
settings → export my data writes a folder to your phone containing your posts at full size, your captions, the comments on your posts, and the handles of the people you were connected to. It is decrypted on your phone, because we could not produce it: we hold nothing readable to give you.
If you no longer have the phone, write to pykapp+privacy@proton.me from the address on your account, or with your handle if it has no address, and we will send what we hold within four weeks: your account record, the handles of your connections, and the encrypted files and the locked keys if you want them. We cannot send readable photographs, because we cannot read them.
Children
You must be 18 or older to use people you know. We ask for your date of birth once, at signup, compare it, and keep only the fact that you passed.
If the date passes, the app then asks the app store whether you are under 18: Google Play’s Age Signals service on Android, and Apple’s Declared Age Range service on an iPhone with iOS 26.2 or later, where Apple applies it. Apple shows you a sheet asking whether to share your age range. The store answers with an age range, or with nothing. The app reads the answer once, on your phone, and refuses signup if it says you are under 18. The answer is not sent to us, and the app keeps it nowhere.
Changes
If this policy changes, the date at the top of this page changes with it. If a change means we keep more about you, keep it longer, or use it for something new, we will also tell you in the app before it takes effect. A change never lets anybody use what we already hold in a way this page did not allow when we collected it, unless you agree to that.
Contact
pykapp+privacy@proton.me